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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
Memb'e

By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH
of the Denver firm of Sears & Goldsmith, and Instructor
in Law, University of Denver College of Law

The cases being considered in this review are grouped into
various broad subdivisions. Perhaps the most important case is one
dealing -with the interpretation of what was intended to be a covenant not to sue.' Failure to know of it could be disastrous to the
practitioner of the law.
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE

,In Nucla Sanitation Dist. v. Rippy, 2 the district sued to recover
damages for an alleged breach of contract. Rippy counterclaimed
for work done and expenses incurred in reliance on the district's
representation that it had accepted a counter-offer made by Rippy.
The facts of the case were as follows: the district prepared a written contract and mailed it to Rippy. Rippy signed and returned the
contract, but sent a covering letter stating that his acceptance was
conditioned on extension of the proposed completion date. Rippy
moved in his construction equipment after speaking to the president of the district and having been assured that everything was
all right regarding the contract and the conditional letter of acceptance. The district, in the meantime, had written to Rippy refusing to extend the completion date. Rippy pulled off the job
when he received the district's letter. The Court held that Ripp's
conditional acceptance of the district's offer amounted to a counteroffer which was never accepted by the district. No contract resulted. An approved instruction stated, in essence, that an acceptance
must be in the identical terms of the offer, without any modification whatever, otherwise it is only a counter-proposition.
In Superior Distrib. Corp. v. Points,3 the plaintiff recovered
the money he had paid to the defendant under a purchase order.
After receiving the purchase order and the deposit money, Superior
required Points to sign a note and conditional sales contract, on
terms different from those in the purchase order, and refused to deliver the purchased merchandise unless these additional documents
were executed. Judgment for the purchaser was affirmed in a holding that Superior could not claim the benefits of the original contract while denying its obligations under that contract and demanding a new agreement. The Nucla Sanitation case is cited along with
two other cases which hold that an acceptance on terms varying
from those offered is a rejection of offer.
CONSIDERATION

In Arrow Mfg. Co. v. Ross, 4 employees and employer had discussed the possibility of an increase in pay. After the end of the
employer's fiscal year, the employer sought permission of the Wage
I Price v. Baker, 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1959). At the time of this writing a petition
for re-hearing has not been determined. This case is discussed in the text at footnote 26 infra.
2 344 P.2d 976 (Colo. 1959).
3 347 P.2d 140 (Colo. 1959).
4 346 P.2d 305 (Colo. 1959).
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Stabilization Board to pay a retroactive bonus for the preceding
fiscal year. Between the end of that year and the receipt of approval from the Board, some of the employees were discharged for
lack of work. The court held that the discharged employees were
not entitled to participate in this gratuitous bonus since the employees gave no consideration upon which it could be contended
they had an agreement with their employer for the payment to
them of a share of the authorized bonus. Continued employment
could not be said to have been induced by the expectation of a
bonus since the employees knew nothing of it.
Schweizer v. Amalgamated Butcher Workmen 5 is here included for the limited purpose of illustrating an accord and satisfaction
between the plaintiff and the defendant concerning the plaintiff's
claims for vacation and sick pay. After discharge, the plaintiff and
her employer met and agreed on the sum of $100.45 for these items
and a check for this amount was given to her. The plaintiff did not
cash this check. The mutual agreements regarding vacation and
sick pay, by way of compromise, were consideration for each party
giving up additional rights then asserted. Having compromised the
disputed claims, an accord and satisfaction arose.
In Police Pension and Relief Board v. McPhail,6 the view was
approved that the pension claimed by policemen had the attributes
of a contract and was entitled to constitutional protection. 7 The
plaintiffs' employment was under a written contract on terms set
forth in the charter and an ordinance of the City and County of
Denver8 providing that plaintiffs would receive a pension subject
to increase or decrease based on the salary of the rank which they
occupied as of date of retirement. One factor which weighed heavily in favor of the policemen was that they had contributed to the
pension fund through the years. The court recognizes that the contract principle regarding the pension escalation clause here adopted
is a minority view, but is supported by consideration paid by the
policemen, which consisted of regular contributions paid out of the
policemen's taxable income.
CONDITIONS

Two fire insurance policies were construed in Standard Marine
Ins. Co. v. PeckY One policy contained a condition suspending the
insurance coverage at such times as there might be an increased
hazard within the control and knowledge of the insured; the other
policy denied coverage for loss or damage arising from illegal trade.
The plaintiff's losses arose out of a fire caused by ignition of fireworks. The court found that fireworks were held for sale contrary
to an applicable statute. This increased hazard being in the control
or knowledge of the insured, and the fireworks trade being illegal,
the trial court's judgments for plaintiff were reversed.
Where a party to a contract in effect promises to procure the
occurrence of a condition, and does not make a bona fide effort to
secure such occurrence, recovery of monies dependent upon the
5
6
7
8
9

347 P.2d 516 (Colo. 1959).
338 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. Const., art. II, § 11.
Denver, Colo., Charter § 133, at 45.46 (1953).
342 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1959).
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non-existence of the condition will be denied. Accordingly, in Maruca v. Hunter & Presba,Inc.,10 a judgment refusing to return plaintiff's deposit on purchase of a tavern was affirmed, even though a
stated condition never occurred, because plaintiff had not made a
bona fide effort to secure a loan. This loan was a condition in a receipt and option on the non-occurrence of which the vendor was to
return purchaser's deposit.
In Jahn v. Park Hill Realty Co.,11 the broker secured judgment
against the defendant owners for his commission under a listing
agreement which gave the broker an exclusive right to sell. The
owners gave possession during the period of an extension of the
listing, which extension the court found to have been ratified by
the co-owner who had not joined in the extension agreement. The
deed was withheld until after the extended listing had expired.
Testimony supported the position that the sale was closed when the
purchasers moved in, which was prior to termination of the extended listing. The condition under the listing of a sale "either by the
undersigned owner, the undersigned broker, or by any person... "12
occurred when the owners sold during the listing period, and the
broker's right to commission
was immediately perfected.
14
An earlier decision 13 was re-affirmed in Hayutin v. DeAndrea
to the effect that a broker who does not have an exclusive right to
sell cannot collect a commission on a sale which is consummated to
a person not produced by the broker. In order for the broker to
collect, it is not necessary that his efforts be the sole cause of the
sale; however, they must be the predominating effective cause of
the sale. In Hayutin, the owner called in the broker after the purchaser had first contacted the owner.
Conditions relating to cancellation of contracts were considered
in City of Fort Collins v. Park View Pipe Line.15 In this case the
city reserved the right to cancel outside-water-users' contracts "at
any time upon giving written notice of intent so to do" in one group
of contracts, and in another contract the cancellation clause provided for cancellation "when, in the judgment of the City Council, the
interests of the City of Fort Collins require the discontinuance of
such service in order to better serve the inhabitants of the City of
10 344 P.2d 968 (Colo. 1959).
11 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 223 (1959).
12 Ibid.

13 Heady v. Tomlinson, 134 Colo. 33, 299 P.2d 120 (1956).
14 337 P.2d 383 (Colo. 1959).
15 336 P.2d 716 (Colo. 1959).
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Fort Collins." Water users having contracts with the first type of
cancellation clause could not object to cancellation on notice. The
second type of cancellation clause was held to state a condition
which the city council must first find to exist. This provision for
termination, like a "just cause" or "good cause" required a finding
of fact based upon a fair and honest cause regulated by good faith
on the part of the party exercising the power to terminate.
MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED

Two cases arose under this general subject. The first, Crouch
v. Mountain States Feed Co.,' 7 holds that where a plaintiff seeks to
recover upon a quasi-contractual theory of money had and received,
having elected to waive the tort which gave rise to the implied contract to pay the money, he must show that the defendant actually
received the money claimed. Judgment for plaintiff in this action
was reversed and a new trial ordered because such receipt had not
been proved.
In the other case, American Medical and Dental Ass'n v.
Brown,18 Brown paid the association the amount it claimed on an
assigned claim in order to secure a release of garnishment. Brown
later found a receipt evidencing previous payment of the assigned
claim to the assignor. The court approved a judgment, in favor of
Brown, on the theory of money had and received by the association through coercion by the garnishment proceedings. In equity
and good conscience the money should be returned to Brown since
payment to the association represented a duplication.
AcCOUNT STATED

The case of Johnson v. Adams19 once again sets forth the elements 20 necessary to prove an account stated. In this case the court
denied the existence of an account stated. A finding of the trial
court that there was a dispute as to part of the claim was approved.
The mere sending of a bill, and a failure of the recipient to object
thereto, was not sufficient to establish an account stated.
MECHANIC'S LIEN CASES

Sontag v. Abbott 2 l emphasizes the danger of permitting the

holder of an option to purchase real estate, to take any steps toward
the commencement of a building prior to recordation of the purchase money encumbrance. Sontag lent the optionee the purchase
money, and received a note and deed of trust to secure it. Two days
before Sontag received and recorded the trust deed, the optionee
ordered material from Abbott, which was immediately delivered to
the premises. The materials were incorporated in a structure built
by the optionee. All of the building operation took place after the
16
17
1
19
20

Id. at 720.
343 P.2d 1052 (Colo. 1959).
344 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1959).
337 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1959).
The court stated that the elements of account stated are epitomized as follows:
1. An account which must have been examined and accepted by the parties;
2. An agreement that the balance and all items of account representing the previous monetary
transactions of the perties are correct;
3. An admission of liability to the apparent debtor for the amount of the balance against him.
4. The assent of both parties and a meeting of the minds.
Id. at 603.
21 344 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1959).
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option ripened into a fee title. Sontag foreclosed his deed of trust
and received a trustee's deed. Thereafter, Abbott sued to foreclose
his mechanic's lien. The trial court's holding was affirmed to the
effect that the optionee held an interest in land by virtue of his option. When this interest later ripened into a fee title, the date of delivery of materials would be treated under the statute as "commencement of the work" 22 for purposes of establishing priority of
liens between Sontag and the materialmen. The materialmen won
out over the mortgagee.
The other mechanic's lien case, Hayutin v. Gibbons,23 holds that
a materialman may have a valid action for debt, for the full amount
of goods delivered to the project, even though his lien may be for
less than the contract price of the goods. Johnson was Hayutin's
building contractor. The contract between Hayutin and Johnson
was filed pursuant to statute. On disputed facts, the trial court
found that Hayutin had ratified Johnson's contract with the materialman by expressly promising payment for such materials.
Through the ratification the unauthorized act of Johnson bound
EHayutin, in spite of the limitation clause in the statute. 24 Hayutin's
personal liability thus exceeded the amount of the lien.
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS

Some cases, discussed under other headings, could be discussed
here. In Hutchinson v. Elder,25 there is a holding that inept expressions should not be allowed to defeat the evident intention of the
contract. It is further held that an interpretation making the contract fair and reasonable is to be preferred to one which would be
harsh and unreasonable. The case involves a contract between the
landowner and a building contractor which contemplated a joint
venture to develop a residential area. Construction loan costs were
held to be the sole obligation of the landowner and not included in
the term "ultimate cost of the houses". A provision for payment of
fifty per cent of "any amount obtained from.the sale of any house
as additional compensation to the contractor was held to require deduction of usual sale and closing expenses and to be the
equivalent of an agreement to divide the net amount obtained on
the sale. Mr. Justice Moore dissented, stating that the majority
opinion makes a new contract by writing in the word "net". While
dissenting opinions do not satisfy litigants, they often, as here, enable the reader to gain a clearer concept of the problem involved.
The "booby trap" case referred to in the introductory paragraph is Price v. Baker.2 6 Here the plaintiffs gave a so-called covenant not to sue to one of three defendants, after plaintiffs' action
for damages for fraud and deceit was set for trial. The covenant
stated that plaintiffs ".

.

. expressly reserves (sic) the right to sue

and continue to sue any other person or persons against whom they
may have or assert any claim for loss or damage .... ,27The cov22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 86-3.3 (1953).
23 338 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959).
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 86-3-1, .2 (1953).

The filing of a contract which conformed to the require-

ments of these sections of Mechanic Lien Statutes has sometimes

proven to be the most effective way

that the owner can limit his liability to mechanics, materialmen and subcontractors. It would have
served Hayutin's purpose here except for his ratification of the unauthorized contract.
25 344 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1959).
26 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 157 (1959).
27 Id. at 158.
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enant further provided that it might be pleaded as a defense in bar
or abatement of any action against the covenantee. The covenantee

was, by stipulation, dismissed without prejudice. The other two defendants then moved for summary judgment of dismissal for them
as well, alleging that the covenant was a release since it could be
pled as a bar, and that a release of one joint tortfeasor was a release of all. In a four to three decision, the covenant was held to be
equivalent to a release of the one joint tortfeasor thereby releasing
the others. It is difficult to reconcile the kindly language in Hutchison v. Elder28 with the harsh result in Price, a result which appears
to be exactly contrary to the expressed intent of the covenant in
Price. An excellent dissent by Mr. Justice Doyle, with Justices Day
and Frantz concurring, must be studied by every practitioner. The
better view, in the opinion of this reviewer, would be to overrule
Morris v. Diers29 which supports the majority opinion and follow
those cases cited in the dissent which hold that a release which contains a reservation of right against remaining defendants should be
construed as a covenant not to sue.
In Ryan v. Fitzpatrick Drilling Co.,30 the plaintiff contractor
agreed to drill an oil well in Wyoming to a depth sufficient to test
the Curtis sands or to a total depth of 4300 feet. The contract also
provided that any drilling costs, after the necessary Schlumberger
electric log had been run, was to be borne twenty-five per cent by
the contractor, seventy-five per cent by the defendant operator. The
Curtis sand was encountered at 4775 feet. The plaintiff sought to
recover three-quarters of the cost of alleged extras representing
drilling costs between 4300 and 4775 feet. The judgment of the trial
court awarding the plaintiff three-quarters of the cost of claimed
extras was affirmed. The defendant claimed that the test clause
modified the depth clause and that no extras could be claimed until
the test had been run. Approval was given to the trial court's finding that plaintiff was required to drill only to a depth to test the
Curtis sand or to a total depth of 4300 feet whichever was reached
first. Additional drilling was therefore to be compensated on a
quantum meruit basis and evidence of a trade custom was admitted
to establish the value of such extras.
In Greeley & Loveland Irrigation Co. v. McCloughan, 1 plaintiff's predecessor had a right to 140 inches of water from defendant.
For a period of forty-five years such predecessor, and later plaintiff,
had accepted only 100 inches. In reversing the trial court's decree
quieting title in plaintiff to the claimed additional water, the court
held that the construction placed on a contract by the parties, before controversy arose, was a reliable test of their own interpretation of the contract. It was held that the long continued distribution of water in a manner wholly inconsistent with the contract on
which plaintiffs relied, along with other evidence, defeated plaintiff's claim.
28 344
29, 134
30 342
31 342

P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1959).
Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1959).
P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1959).
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ESTOPPEL AND RATIFICATION

In Western Motor Rebuilders, Inc. v. Carlson,3" the plaintiff
bought land from Carlson, and fully paid for it. Thereafter, with
Carlson's full knowledge, plaintiff entered into possession and constructed a motel, costing approximately $45,000, on the land. Five
months after payment and plaintiff's entry, Carlson recorded restrictive covenants and thereafter delivered the deed to the plaintiff. In reversing a decree of the trial court enjoining the purchaser
from operating any business enterprise on the land in violation of

the restrictive covenants, the court pointed to the actions of the parties before the controversy as being one of the best indications of
their true intent. Viewed in this light there was no contractual prohibition against a business use of the land. Plaintiff-seller testified
that while defendant was
building the motel, she just sat by and
"said nothing. I listened."3 3 Such conduct, the court stated, estopped
the plaintiff to assert any breach of the restrictive conditions later
recorded. Query: Can the same past-contractual event (silence)
form the basis of contract interpretation, and of estoppel?
In Ashback v. Wenzel, 34 a judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
The plaintiff sought to obtain damages for an alleged breach of
contract, which breach was found not to exist, and plaintiff sought
to accelerate maturity under the promissory notes by reason of the
payor's failure to pay on time. The evidence disclosed that for
thirty-one months the payee had accepted late payments. Such
long-continued acceptance of late payments was held to waive the
defaults so far as time of payment was concerned and to prevent
the payee from declaring the entire unpaid balance due and payable
without prior warning. In Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Selected Pictures, Inc., 35 so far as pertinent to this review, it is held that retention of proceeds of a contract may constitute ratification of the
contract.
RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION OF CONTRACT

Rescission of purchase of stock in a mining company was per-

mitted in O.K. Uranium Development Co. v. Miller.36 Here representations had been made that the company had valuable properties, sufficient funds to carry on exploration for at least six months

without further financing, was in good financial condition, and that
ore samples exhibited were from the company's properties. In fact,
the company only had properties under option in the name of one
of its chief officers. Miller testified that he believed the representations, and that had he known them to be false he would not have
invested his money. A judgment of rescission for fraud in the inducement to plaintiff to purchase the stock was affirmed. It is interesting to note that the type of option right claimed by the company in this case was the same as in Sontag v. Abbott.37 This indi-

cates that the same type of right may change its character with its
context; the optionee there had sufficient right to create mechanic's
32 138 Colo. 404, 335 P.2d 272 (1959).
33 Id. at 417, 335 P.2d at 279.
34 346 P.2d 295 (Colo. 1959).
35 138 Colo. 468, 335 P.2d 260 (1959).
:16 345 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1959).
37 344 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1959); 344 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1959), discussed in text at note 21 supra.
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liens, but he does not here have "property" to make his representations to Miller true.
In Olinger Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Christy,38 the insurer sought
to avoid a life insurance policy on the basis of misrepresentations
made in the application for coverage. The court holds that an insurance contract is not sui generis. In order to avoid such, or any
other contract, the quantum of proof must, according to the court,
be clear, convincing, indubitable, and beyond a reasonable doubt.
The same quantum is said to be required to avoid a contract for
fraud, concealment or mistake. Mr. Justice Moore filed a written
case should be compared with40 language in
dissent. The principal
Woodruff v. Clarke39 and Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp.
In Askins v. Easterling,1 an oral contract between the plaintiff
and his deceased wife was examined. The wife had made the down
payment on real property which was to have been purchased in the
names of both the husband and wife. The plaintiff made succeeding payments on the property, in part from rentals on the property.
After the decedent's death, it was discovered that she had taken the
property in her sole name and had later conveyed the property to
herself and her son by a prior marriage as joint tenants. The court
held that the son took an undivided one-half interest in the property
as constructive trustee for the plaintiff-husband.

The court ap-

38 342 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1959).
39 128 Colo. 387, 262 P.2d 737 (1953).
40 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946). In this case there was a holding that fraud may be inferred
from inadequacy of consideration. It may be difficult to reconcile such inference with the requirement
that a misrepresentation must be "indubitable".
41 347 P.2d 126 (Colo. 1959).
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proved a finding that the oral contract had been breached by the
wife, but also stated that such a contract must be established by
clear and convincing evidence.
ATTORNEYS FEES, INTEREST AND DAMAGES

In Rock Wool Insulating Co. v. Huston4 2 the court said that attorney's fees which were not shown to have been actually incurred
or paid by plaintiff-payee could not be secured in an action on a
promissory note providing for such fees. The lower court's judgment for such fees, being unsupported by any evidence, was reversed.
In Stone v. Currigan4 3 the Colorado Interest Statute 44 was con-

strued as requiring interest to be paid to a judgment creditor whose
judgment was entered January 13, 1958, nunc pro tunc, as of the
earlier date, February 16, 1956. This case is included here because
of the following dictum: "By way of carefully considered dictum,
let it be known that any creditor who can bring himself within the
terms of the quoted statute is entitled to interest from his debtor, '4"
even though the original judgment may have omitted the adjudication of interest.
In an action for damages for a landlord's refusal to grant a
lease pursuant to contract, 46 a judgment for plaintiff was reduced
by eliminating expected profits from a business to be operated at
the intended situs of the leased premises. The loss of such profits
was characterized as being purely conjectural, based upon complete
realization of the lessee's most ambitious hopes and dreams for the
new future. The court stated that "litigants cannot be permitted to
estimate the money out of the coffers of their opponents in this
reckless way..

..

-41

Interest was allowed on the statutory penalty bond 48 of a motor
vehicle dealer in Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co. v. State.49 The
cause of action arose in October 1947. The interest was allowed
from date of commencement of the action, June 16, 1948.
MISCELLANEOUS

CASES

The case of Colorado Mortgage Co. v. Nolan" is a follow-up
stating the same law as in the original case between the parties.5 1
University of Denver v. Industrial Comm'n 52 holds, insofar as
pertinent to this review, that parties cannot by private contract
abrogate statutory requirements or conditions affecting the public
policy of the state. Consequently, a receipt in full payment for
commuted installments due under the Workmen's Compensation

Act 53 does not prevent the employee from re-opening the case with-

in the statutory period.
42 346 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1959).
43 334 P.2d 740 (Colo. 1959).
44 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 73-1-2 (1953).
45 334 P.2d at 743.
46 Nevin v. Bates, 347 P.2d 776 (Colo. 1959).
47 Id.

at 778.

48 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-11-9 (1953).
49 347 P.2d 507 (Colo. 1959).
50 347 P.2d 778 (Colo. 1959).
51 Nolan v. Colorado Mortgage Co., 137 Colo. 103, 322 P.2d 98 (1958), 36 DICTA 22 (1959).
52 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959).
53 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-14-19 (1953).
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